The first version of what is now known as the Powell Doctrine was in the 1992 National Military Strategy, which reflected purported lessons from the Gulf War. military culture, a wariness about incompetent civilian leaders too carelessly employing America’s sword for dubious causes in protracted or ambiguous contingencies.īuoyed by the successful application of overwhelming decisive force in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, but facing continuous pressure for humanitarian intervention in the Balkans and a rising famine in Somalia, Colin Powell updated Weinberger’s guidance. The Weinberger Doctrine reflected a dominant strain in the U.S. Weinberger, (presumably with the advice of General Powell who was an assistant to the Secretary at the time) reduced the Pentagon’s painful lessons from Vietnam into a set of conditions for proper employment of America’s combat power. The first iteration was not in fact directly authored by General Powell: rather, it was Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s 1984 suite of criteria for policymakers contemplating the use of U.S military power. The Powell Doctrine’s origins can be traced to the Vietnam War. Now, in light of Iraq and Afghanistan, the benefits of this doctrine are far more apparent. I was also concerned about the civil-military relations precedent of the Nation’s senior military leadership establishing conditions for why, where and how military force should be employed. Twenty years ago, I found the Powell Doctrine profoundly flawed as a codification of false lessons from Vietnam.